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Executive Summary:

Southwest Missouri’s Public
Health Response to COVID-19
Spring 2022

The Public Health Response to COVID-19 in the Southwest Region of Missouri is one of three regional reports
that offers findings from conversations with local stakeholders and residents about their experience with the
state and region’s pandemic response. The study focused
on the period from March 2020 through May 2021, just
prior to the surge caused by the delta variant and well
before the emergence of the omicron variant. Its aim is
to document efforts by Southwest Missouri’s local public
health agencies (LPHAs) and a multitude of other stakeholders to combat COVID-19, and to identify lessons
that could strengthen public health practices to better
safeguard communities in the future.
Missouri’s approach to public health is decentralized, and
as such LPHAs were tasked with tapping local, regional,
and state relationships and resources to wage a locally
tailored response to a global virus. Uneven resources and
a varied approach challenged pandemic response coordination, both regionally and across the state, despite
enormous dedication by local public health; state and
local elected officials; health care organizations; first
responders; community non-profits; and countless others.
Southwest Missouri’s 18 local public health departments
(defined using the boundaries of Highway Patrol Region D1)

have been chronically underfunded compared to departments in other states. Years of underinvestment in local
public health agencies took an enormous toll on staff,
operations, and all other aspects of LPHAs’ response to
COVID-19. Some LPHAs had reserves they had built over a
period of years that could be tapped for a major scale-up
in workforce and other needed areas. Other LPHAs had
little or no rainy-day funds and depended heavily on federal Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act
(CARES Act) dollars to bridge their funding gaps. In the
absence of CARES Act funding or reserves, LPHAs were
challenged to muster a robust pandemic response and
maintain traditional public health programs designed to
help those most in need in their communities.
Our hope is that the following key study findings will be
leveraged to strengthen the public health system’s ability
to continue responding to the COVID-19 pandemic and
to face future crises with greater resources, coordination,
equitable strategies, modernized infrastructure, and
public trust. Because Missouri is a large and diverse
state, we also acknowledge there is no single pandemic
story. Experiences and events of the crisis — including
the speed of the virus’s spread, how infection impacted
populations, and how local authorities and stakeholders
responded — differed from region to region.

1 Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services divides its health reporting regions according to the Missouri State Highway
Patrol map. To view the regional map, see https://health.mo.gov/data/gis/pdf/map_ReportingRegions.pdf.
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Readers therefore may also be interested in the companion
reports, The Public Health Response to COVID-19
in the Northeast Region of Missouri2 and The Public
Health Response to COVID-19 in the St. Louis Region of
Missouri3. Findings from the three reports were used to
inform the state-level recommendations in our report

Missouri’s Public Health Response to COVID-19: Key
Findings and Recommendations for State Action and
Investment, which was developed for the purpose of
strengthening the state public health system’s ability to
face future crises, and to capitalize on new and timely federal funding opportunities in the wake of the pandemic.4

2 Trott, J., Mead, K., Markus, A., Acosta, A., Baños, J., Conway, C., Benoit, M., and Regenstein, M. “The Public Health Response to
COVID-19 in the Northeast Region of Missouri” (2022). Health Policy and Management Issue Briefs. https://hsrc.himmelfarb.gwu.
edu/sphhs_policy_missouri/
3 Regenstein, M., Mead, K., Trott, J., Seyoum, S., Baños, J., Van Bronkhorst, H., Benoit, M., and Hughes, D. “The Public Health
Response to COVID-19 in the St. Louis Region of Missouri” (2022). Health Policy and Management Issue Briefs. https://hsrc.himmelfarb.gwu.edu/sphhs_policy_missouri/
4 Levi, J., Regenstein, M., Hughes, D., Trott, J., Markus, A., Seyoum, S., Acosta, A., Benoit, M., Van Bronkhorst, H., Conway, C.
“Missouri’s Public Health Response to COVID-19: Key Findings and Recommendations for State Action and Investment”.
(September 2021). Health Policy and Management Issue Briefs. Paper 61. https://hsrc.himmelfarb.gwu.edu/sphhs_policy_briefs/61

KEY FINDINGS: SOUTHWEST MISSOURI’S PUBLIC HEALTH RESPONSE TO COVID-19

Key Finding

A

B

Summary

Prior Natural Disaster
Response and
Preparedness Training
Was an Asset During
the Pandemic

Historical experience with emergency preparedness and disaster response efforts
is a defining characteristic of the Southwest region and was an asset in pandemic
response efforts. However, many stakeholders noted the limited training and
preparation for infectious-disease outbreaks of COVID-19’s scope and scale.

Community Partnerships
Enhanced the Pandemic
Response

Formal and ad hoc partnerships were leveraged within and across sectors to
organize various aspects of local COVID-19 response efforts. Many Southwest
stakeholders reported that pre-existing relationships enabled a more nimble
response, and that community partnerships reduced redundancies and increased
information and resource sharing. Partnerships that included participation from
LPHA directors and local elected officials were perceived as effective, though
some noted that LPHAs did not always participate in partnerships (sometimes due
to limited bandwidth and resources).

Compared to prior infectious-disease efforts like the 2009 H1N1 response, local
public health stakeholders reported weaker coordination with the state.

When response efforts were collaborative, residents were sometimes confused
about where to go or whom to turn to for services and guidance.

C

LPHA Staffing and
Resource Constraints
Profoundly Limited the
Effectiveness of the
Pandemic Response

Chronic funding challenges and limited staffing inhibited the Southwest’s LPHAs
from sufficiently scaling up to meet the region’s public health needs during the
pandemic. Most LPHAs diverted employees to COVID-19 activities, thus taking
away from other essential public health functions. Workforce needs were difficult
to predict. Some LPHAs were able to access federal funds for additional hiring
purposes, but for others administrative hurdles were too onerous.
Although some residents felt frustration with inefficiencies and delays in pandemic
services like testing, most felt that public health authorities had done the best that
they could with the resources in hand.

The Public Health Response to COVID-19 in the Southwest Region of Missouri
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D

Poor Coordination
Between the State and
Local Levels Exacerbated
the Spread of Infection

A decentralized public health system and “home rule” approach to policy drove
pandemic response efforts. Though communities were empowered to take a
locally tailored approach, inconsistent public health guidance and protocols
weakened messaging and mitigation strategies, including masking, quarantining,
social distancing, and testing. Communities in which public health and local
elected leaders worked in tandem were viewed as more effective.
Confusion existed around which local entity had the authority to implement
and enforce pandemic policies. Furthermore, the organization of health regions
according to the state highway patrol map was not viewed as useful to response
efforts like vaccine distribution.

E

Weak Data Reporting
and Outdated IT Systems
Stymied Timely Decision
Making

LPHA and state data systems were not aligned or up-to-date, and various
workarounds were used locally to track cases, testing, and vaccines. New case
tracking systems were introduced by the state later in the pandemic. Some LPHAs
were able to leverage technology to gain efficiencies.
Discrepancies in state and local data undermined trust in the data among
some residents. Technology played a key role in pandemic response efforts like
vaccination registration, which led to some residents challenged by internet and
technology access being left out.

F

Disjointed Communications
Eroded Public Confidence
and Created Space for
Misinformation to Flourish

Inconsistent messaging weakened public health credibility and contributed
to confusion over which guidelines residents and stakeholders should follow.
Additionally, misinformation on certain news outlets and social media called
into question the threat of the virus, and important public health strategies like
vaccination suffered as a result.
LPHAs, health care leaders, and other partners tried to get ahead of misinformation
with varied results. Most Southwest residents who participated in focus groups
for this case study trusted and regularly sought information from their local health
department, and one-third knew who their local health director was by name.

G

Public Health Was Not
Sufficiently Responsive to
High Rates of Poverty in
the Region

Many Southwest residents are living in poverty, making them more vulnerable to
COVID-19’s impacts. These residents experienced financial, technological, and
transportation accessibility challenges when it came to seeking public health
services and health care. In some areas of the region, lack of public and political
support for anti-poverty measures was believed to have made it difficult to
prioritize assistance for those living in poverty during the pandemic.

H

The Pandemic Response
Inadequately Served the
Needs of Latino, Black, and
Immigrant Communities

People of color made up a disproportionate share of COVID-19 infections and
deaths, and many, including immigrants, held essential jobs that put them at
increased risk of exposure. Pandemic services like testing and contact tracing were
sometimes difficult to access due to cost, language, and transportation barriers.
Some Black and Latino residents distrusted the government response in part due
to experiences of racism.
In some counties, there was a disconnect between LPHA communication and
community needs when it came to outreach to underserved and linguistically diverse
groups. LPHAs were not always able to hire interpreter services and campaigns did
not necessarily target communities with culturally sensitive messaging.
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Study Approach
and Methods
In summer 2020, Missouri Foundation for Health contracted with The George
Washington University Milken Institute School of Public Health to assess Missouri’s public health preparedness and response capacities to the COVID-19
pandemic and future public health crises. The purpose of the regional case
studies is to 1) document the multi-level and multi-stakeholder efforts to combat
COVID-19 and 2) identify lessons from the pandemic that could strengthen
public health practices to better safeguard communities in the future.
In the Southwest region, which is designated Region D by Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services (DHSS) (Figure 2), we spoke candidly
with 30 professional stakeholders in various counties and towns (see the
types of stakeholders we interviewed in Appendix A, Table A). Our sample
included stakeholders within and outside the field of public health, including
schools, health care, the business community, faith-based groups, policymakers, and social service organizations. Our interviews began in October 2020
and concluded in May 2021, prior to the surge caused by the delta variant.
We promised confidentiality and anonymity to study participants to encourage candor when recounting their perspectives and professional experiences.
We refer to this group throughout the report as stakeholders.
We also conducted 12 focus groups with people living in the Southwest region
to examine public perceptions of the pandemic response. We refer to this group
throughout the report as focus group residents or participants. We spoke with a
total of 78 residents during spring 2021. To delve into how the pandemic uniquely
impacted a variety of racial and ethnic groups, we held two focus groups with
Hispanic/Latino residents (a total of 16 participants) and one group with Black
residents and family members (a total of 12 participants; some family members
identified as White or mixed race). Table B in Appendix A provides information
on the characteristics of the focus group participants. One limitation of our study
is that our sample of residents consisted of individuals who were well-informed
about and interested in discussing the Southwest region’s response to COVID-19.
They were also generally supportive of public health’s role in helping to stop
the spread of the virus. As such, they provided thoughtful and reasoned input
on the public health response in Missouri; however, we acknowledge that our
sample does not represent large groups of residents who favored a limited
role for public health and other government organizations with respect to the
COVID-19 response.
Our interviews with stakeholders and focus group discussions with residents
were supplemented by media accounts and other publicly available data sources.
For more information on the study methodology see Appendix A.

How the COVID-19
Pandemic Unfolded in
Southwest Missouri
March 2020 – May 2021

I’ll never forget that he said, ‘The closest parallel we can see is probably the Spanish
flu of 1918.’ And I remember saying at the time, ‘Well, the first thing you need to
be clear is never say Spanish flu again. That’s going to scare everybody. There’s
no reason to do this that way. Let’s not lose our heads here.’ But obviously, he was
right. That is the closest parallel.
– LOCAL BUSINESS STAKEHOLDER

As context to understanding the COVID-19 response
in Southwest Missouri, it is important to first paint a
picture of how the virus impacted the region and its
residents over the time of the case study, from March
2020 through May 2021.
In the early months of the pandemic, Southwest Missouri
did not initially see high rates of cases, hospitalizations,
and deaths, especially compared to more populated
regions of the state such as St. Louis and Kansas City (see
Figure 1). Local public health authorities thus approached
the situation with a degree of uncertainty. Public sentiment

in these early months was divided, with some pushing
for strict mitigation efforts and others opposing public
health restrictions they considered disproportionate to
the threat as it was understood at the time.5 By April,
however, local public health departments, health care, and
other community organizations had opened shared lines
of communication, and some had formed multi-sector
partnerships to respond to the escalating crisis.
Following a statewide stay-at-home order on April 3,
2020, and an extension to that order on April 16 that
placed limits on building capacity and non-essential

5 Woodin, D. (2020, April 1). Residents question city’s stance on shelter-in-place order. The Joplin Globe. https://www.joplinglobe.
com/coronavirus/residents-question-citys-stance-on-shelter-in-place-order/article_b2ea8369-084b-5610-b740-695f09f959ec.html
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FIGURE 1. WEEKLY AND CUMULATIVE COVID-19 CASES FOR SOUTHWEST MISSOURI,
Weekly
Cumulative
MARCH
2020 – and
NOVEMBER
2021 PCR Confirmed COVID-19 Cases: MSHP
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This graph represents weekly and cumulative PCR confirmed COVID-19 cases for Highway Patrol Region D.
SOURCE: Missouri Hospital Association analysis of MO DHSS EpiTrax data, Mar. 10, 2020 – Nov. 30, 2021.

travel6,7 shifts in business operations began negatively
affecting the area’s economy. In Taney County, home
to much of the state’s tourism activity, unemployment
climbed to 24.5% by April 2020.8 These early economic
shocks, coupled with the public’s perception that the
virus posed little risk, likely contributed to localized
resistance to public health mitigation measures, including
mask mandates.

In early May 2020, federal funds from the CARES Act
were distributed to counties, ostensibly for activities
like contact tracing and testing.9 However, some county
governments refused to pass the funds on to their
LPHAs. As a consequence, some LPHAs were forced
to draw upon their own limited resources, dipping into
reserve funds and diverting precious staff resources to
pandemic efforts.10

6 Missouri Governor Michael L. Parson. Stay at home order. (2020, April 3). https://governor.mo.gov/press-releases/archive/governor-parson-issues-statewide-stay-home-missouri-order-control-contain
7 Missouri Governor Michael L. Parson. Extension stay at home order COVID-19. (2020, April 16).
https://governor.mo.gov/press-releases/archive/governor-parson-extends-statewide-stay-home-missouri-order-through-may-3
8 Missouri Department of Labor & Industrial Relations. Unemployment benefits by county.
https://laborwebapps.mo.gov/ui_stats?s=1&county=107&month_year=All+Months%2FYears
9 Missouri State Treasurer. Treasurer Fitzpatrick Announces First CARES Act Payments to Local Governments Processed.
(2020, May 4). https://treasurer.mo.gov/newsroom/news-and-events-item?pr=d1bd7058-eca5-40b3-af74-cae92d8d0da8
10 Weinberg, T. (2020, October 30). ‘Emotional rollercoaster’: Missouri county health agencies struggle to get federal COVID-19 funds.
The Missouri Independent. https://missouriindependent.com/2020/10/29/emotional-rollercoaster-county-health-agencies-struggle-to-get-federal-covid-19-funds/
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Summer and fall 2020 saw a sharp rise in cases that overwhelmed local public health agencies’ capacity to conduct
contact tracing. Some LPHAs brought in temporary staff,
and most leaned on other sectors, such as health care
and education, for help shouldering the burden.
By summer 2020, disparities in case counts and deaths
were becoming evident everywhere in the state, including the Southwest region. Older adults were particularly
vulnerable due to outbreaks in nursing homes, assisted-living centers, and long-term care facilities, which
accounted for half of COVID-19 deaths in the Southwest
by August 2020.11 Asian or Pacific Islander, Black, and
Hispanic/Latino people working in meat and poultry
processing and in the service industry had a disproportionate burden of infections given higher workplace
exposure.12 Immigrant communities were particularly
vulnerable in McDonald County, for example, where
Tyson and Simmons poultry plants are located. In June
2020, widespread testing at the Tyson facilities found
that nearly one-third of employees were positive for
COVID-19.13 In Jasper County, Hispanic/Latino people
make up 8.5% of the population, but by summer 2020
accounted for 40% of cases.14
Vaccines came to Missouri in December 2020, promising a path forward to combat the virus. Despite their
extensive experience with vaccination protocols and campaigns, many LPHAs in the region faced new challenges

with vaccine distribution, storage, registration, and
tracking efforts. Some areas of the Southwest hosted
high-throughput vaccine sites, delivering thousands of
shots each week by utilizing health systems and federally qualified health centers as the principal vehicle
for vaccine delivery. Initial demand for the vaccine was
overwhelming. But by spring 2021, as demand in the
region dropped, counties in the Southwest found it hard
to use up their supplies. Low vaccination rates would
continue to be a struggle for the Southwest, and for
Missouri as a whole.
Entering spring 2021, with most Southwest counties
reaching their lowest case numbers since the pandemic
began, the few remaining restrictions around social distancing and masks were lifted for fully vaccinated people,
in accordance with CDC guidance at the time.15 Many
public health entities started meeting less frequently.
Exhausted workers in health departments and health
care organizations took a breath, hoping that the worst
of the pandemic was behind them.
Unfortunately, the respite was fleeting as, Missouri’s
Southwest region soon became a harbinger for the rest
of the country. On May 10, 2021, the delta variant was
detected in a sewershed sample in Branson, Missouri.16
Vaccination rates in the region (and the state) were low,
making communities particularly vulnerable to this more
highly transmissible variant of COVID-19.

11 Kull, K. (2020, August 9). Long-term care facility outbreaks responsible for nearly half of SW MO COVID-19 deaths.
Springfield News-Leader. https://www.news-leader.com/story/news/local/ozarks/2020/08/09/sw-missouri-covid-19-deaths-longterm-care-facilities/3322085001/
12 Waltenburg MA, Rose CE, Victoroff T, et al. Coronavirus Disease among Workers in Food Processing, Food Manufacturing,
and Agriculture Workplaces. Emerg Infect Dis. 2021;27(1):243-249. doi:10.3201/eid2701.203821
13 Crews, J. (2020, June 29). Tyson confirms hundreds of COVID-19 cases at Missouri chicken plant. Meat and Poultry.
https://www.meatpoultry.com/articles/23379-tyson-confirms-hundreds-of-covid-19-cases-at-missouri-chicken-plant
14 Martinez Valdivia, S. (2020, August 7). In rural Missouri Latinos learn to contain and cope with the coronavirus.
Kaiser Health News. https://khn.org/news/in-rural-missouri-latinos-learn-to-contain-and-cope-with-the-coronavirus/
15 Rabin, RC., Mandavilli, A., Weiland, N. (2021, May 13). Vaccinated Americans may go without masks in most places, federal
officials say. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/13/health/coronavirus-masks-cdc.html
16 Barone, E. (2021, July 29). How the delta variant overtook Missouri: a lesson for the rest of the U.S. Time.
https://time.com/6085454/delta-variant/
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In the weeks that followed, case rates in Southwest
Missouri skyrocketed back to heights previously seen in
February 2021. In populous Greene County, the delta
variant accounted for around 95% of cases by July 2021.17
Quite literally, Southwest Missouri became the national
story for the pandemic resurgence. Mercy Hospital in
Springfield was operating at a higher capacity than at any
previous point during the pandemic. The neighboring
hospital, Cox Medical Center South, also reported they
were at capacity, stating in an interview with The Atlantic,
“We only get beds available when someone dies, which
happens several times a day.”18 By the first week of
August 2021, cases in Springfield were three times the
national average and cases in Branson were four times the
national average.19 Even more concerning was the number
of children impacted by the variant and the increase
of hospitalizations among this younger age group.
The delta surge had a modest impact on vaccination
rates in the Southwest, which increased 11.1 percentage
points between the first detection of delta on May 10
and three months later, on August 10.20
Since our study ended, the Southwest region continues
to fight the virus, including facing the emergence of
the omicron variant. The past two years have left many
in the public health field feeling defeated; however,
this study comes at an opportune time to address the
long-standing problems and weaknesses that were made
so apparent by COVID-19, and to learn from and invest
in the successes of the region’s pandemic response.

17 Yong, E. (2021, July 16). Delta is driving a wedge through Missouri. The Atlantic.
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2021/07/delta-missouri-pandemic-surge/619456/
18 Yong, E. (2021, July 16). Delta is driving a wedge through Missouri. The Atlantic.
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2021/07/delta-missouri-pandemic-surge/619456/
19 Sullender, A. (2021, August 1). Springfield, MO a COVID-19 hotspot as health leaders battle delta variant, misinformation.
https://www.news-leader.com/story/news/health/2021/08/01/springfield-mo-missouri-COVID-19-hotspot-cdc-guidance-recommends-masks-vaccinated-delta-variant/5418638001/
20 Our World Data. Coronavirus (COVID-19) vaccinations. (2021). https://ourworldindata.org/COVID-vaccinations?country=USA
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I. Public Health Infrastructure
in the Southwest
Missouri’s public health system represents a decentralized approach that relies on decision-making at the
local level.21 Eighteen (18) of the state’s 115 local health
departments are located in counties in the Southwest
region (see Region D, highlighted in Figure 2). Each
county has its own health department of varying size,
staffing, infrastructure, services, governance, and funding
(see Appendix A, Table C), and one city (Joplin) also has
its own health department.
The Southwest’s LPHAs serve a geographic area that is
mostly rural. The median county population is approximately 31,500, with populations ranging from about
7,500 residents in Dade County to nearly 300,000 residents in Greene County, the most populous county in
the region. The state’s third-largest city, Springfield, is
located in Greene County and serves as a major hub
for the Southwest region’s economic and health care
activity. The Southwest is also home to the Branson area,
a highly-visited tourist destination that brings economic
vitality to local economies; however, seasonal population
surges also strain LPHA budgets and staff resources.
The region’s population is predominantly White. Hispanic/
Latino populations range from 2% to 11.4% of residents.
Larger populations of Hispanic/Latino and other ethnic
groups generally reflect sizable numbers of immigrant
workers in agriculture and meat processing industries.

The region has relatively small Black, Asian, and multiracial populations (see Appendix A, Table C).
Poverty is a critical issue in Southwest Missouri. Most
counties (89%) have a poverty rate that exceeds the state
average. LPHAs work to mitigate poverty’s health impacts
through a variety of programs related to healthy food
and nutrition, chronic disease management, maternal
and child health, injury prevention, opioid and other
substance use interventions, and many other issues.
In order to demonstrate the ability to serve a community, local public health departments can seek voluntary
accreditation. The process of accreditation enhances
an LPHA’s ability to respond to public health crises
because it requires a comprehensive review of capacity
and public health processes, including an emphasis
on emergency preparedness. However, accreditation
is costly and time-consuming, which can be a major
deterrent to LPHAs, especially those that serve smaller
populations and thus have fewer staff and resources.22
In the absence of standards that all LPHAs must meet,
there is wide variation in services provided, as well
as staff training and experience. Fifteen of the Southwest’s 18 LPHAs are not accredited by either of the two
accrediting bodies available to LPHAs in the state — the
Public Health Accreditation Board (PHAB), a national
organization that sets standards for tribal, state, local

21 Decentralized local public health governance indicates that local government employees lead local health departments and local
governments have autonomy over fiscal decisions. See, https://www.astho.org/Research/Data-and-Analysis/State-and-Local-Governance-Classification-Tree/.
22 HealthierMO. (2021, March 13). Report on the Capacity of Missouri’s Public Health System to Deliver the Missouri Foundational
Public Health Services Model. https://www.healthiermo.org/our-work
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FIGURE 2. MAP OF MISSOURI DHSS HEALTH REPORTING REGIONS: SOUTHWEST (D)
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and territorial public health agencies,23 and the Missouri
Institute for Community Health (MICH), the accrediting
body for Missouri’s Voluntary Accreditation Program for
LPHAs.24 Just three LPHAs — those in Greene, Polk, and
Taney counties — are accredited by either PHAB, MICH,
or both (see Appendix A, Table C). Further adding to
the diversity of Missouri’s public health system are the

six professional organizations that offer technical support, training, and membership.25 Many LPHAs have
worked collaboratively to set common goals for statewide
public health through HealthierMO, a grassroots initiative
formed in 2017 that convenes public health agencies
and other partners to identify strategic priorities and
alignment across the state’s diverse system.26

23 Public Health Accreditation Board. Why become accredited? https://phaboard.org/why-become-accredited/
24 Missouri Institute for Community Health. Accreditation introduction. https://michweb.org/accreditation-introduction/
25 The six professional organizations include: The Missouri Association of Local Public Health Agencies (https://www.moalpha.org),
Missouri Center for Public Health Excellence (https://www.mocphe.org), Missouri Environmental Health Association (https://mehamo.org/), Missouri Institute for Community Health (https://michweb.org), the Missouri Public Health Association (https://www.
mopha.org), and the Missouri Council for Public Health Nursing (https://health.mo.gov/living/lpha/phnursing/cphn.php).
26 HealthierMO is an initiative of the Missouri Public Health Association with support from Missouri Foundation for Health and
other funders that convenes public health agencies and partners to build “a stronger, more resilient public health system.”
For more information about HealthierMO, see https://www.healthiermo.org/.
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There is also great variation in how LPHAs are funded. In
the Southwest, as in other parts of the state, most counties
received only about 20-30% of their revenues from the
state of Missouri or from federal funding in 2018.27 About
72% of LPHAs in the Southwest are governed by boards of
trustees and raise local funding for public health through a
tax levy.28 Others have adopted a city or county commission
model, in which the LPHA is governed by commissions
and receives financial support through nonspecific county
revenue.29 Adding to the complexity, some cities in the
Southwest, like a handful of other cities throughout the
state, are geographically divided between two counties,
which creates confusion regarding the allocation of funding.
Regardless of the arrangement, Southwest Missouri’s local public health departments, like those across
the state, have been chronically underfunded. In 2020,
Missouri had the lowest per person state public health
funding in the U.S.30 Given vast differences in population
size among Southwest counties, pre-pandemic annual
LPHA revenues ranged from under $300,000 to over
$10 million, and per capita spending ranged from $13
to $68 (see Appendix A, Table C).31
Governance and funding arrangements held enormous
importance for LPHAs during the pandemic. Some LPHAs
had reserves they had built over a period of years that
could be tapped for a major scale-up in workforce and
other needed areas. Other LPHAs had little or no rainyday funds and depended heavily on federal CARES Act
dollars to bridge their funding gaps. In the absence of
CARES Act funding or reserves, LPHAs were challenged
to muster a robust pandemic response and maintain
traditional public health programs designed to help
those most in need in their communities.32

27 Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services. LPHA revenue sources 2018. (2018).
https://health.mo.gov/living/lpha/review18/Table_Contents.php
28 Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services. Public Health Works: A Web-Based Orientation Manual for Public Health
Leaders. (March 2019). https://health.mo.gov/living/lpha/phworks/publichealthworks.pdf
29 Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services. Local public health agencies. https://health.mo.gov/living/lpha/
30 SHADAC Analysis of Per Person State Public Health Funding, State Health Compare. (2021, July 9). SHADAC, University of
Minnesota. http://statehealthcompare.shadac.org/
31 Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services. Revenue Sources for Local Public Health Agencies. (2018).
https://health.mo.gov/living/lpha/review18/Table_Contents.php
32 Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services. CARES Act funding toolkit for local governments.
https://health.mo.gov/news/newsitem/uuid/64d61390-482c-4322-b2b7-71d74ba119d7
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II. Strengths and Challenges in
Southwest Missouri’s Public
Health Response to COVID-19
The following sections present key findings related to strengths and challenges identified by
professionals from multiple sectors involved in the pandemic response, as well as residents’
perceptions of the pandemic response.

A. Prior Natural Disaster Response and Preparedness
Training Was an Asset During the Pandemic
I would say we learned a lot on the fly. We had brought in some new team
members that had some areas of expertise, or at least some experience in emergency preparedness and planning. We leaned a lot on our professional organizations.
We leaned a lot on other health departments. We [tried] not to recreate the wheel
where we didn’t have to.
— LOCAL PUBLIC HEALTH STAKEHOLDER

Southwest Missouri is no stranger to crises. In May 2011,
the city of Joplin, in Jasper County, faced a devastating
tornado, which resulted in 161 deaths, approximately
1,000 injuries, and damage to over 8,000 buildings, at
a financial cost of $2.8 billion.33 The National Institute
of Standards and Technology studied the disaster and
developed recommendations to improve emergency

response, prompting individual sectors, including LPHAs
and hospitals, to update their emergency management
and response plans. A stakeholder from the business
sector stated that the pandemic was “eerily familiar” to
the region because of the 2011 tornado and that the
Southwest was known as being “really resilient” after
the disaster.

33 Griffin, J. The Joplin tornado: a calamity and a boon to resilience, 10 years on. (2021, May 21).
https://www.nist.gov/feature-stories/joplin-tornado-calamity-and-boon-resilience-10-years
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Stakeholders highlighted the strong collaborations in
emergency preparedness efforts across sectors in the
Southwest. Even before the pandemic, emergency
planners from all 18 counties met quarterly at regional
administrators’ meetings and were involved in the
Southwest Missouri Emergency Support Association.
Additionally, emergency managers from the Southwest
met annually at a State Emergency Management Conference, where they collaborated with leaders from other
regions. An interviewee in the emergency management
sector described the connections as “very strong locally,
really strong regionally, and a little strong across regions.”
The Southwest also had a relatively active Community
Organizations Active in Disaster (COAD), which focused
on coordinating emergency responses to address gaps
in the response and avoid duplicating services. In many
counties, the LPHAs were actively involved with their
respective COADs, planning and training together. One
emergency manager described conducting an exercise
on a health emergency with their LPHA prior to the pandemic, which identified gaps in information sharing and
funding. This knowledge allowed the county to jump
right into the pandemic with an activated emergency
operations center; the emergency manager “talked every
single day with public health.”
Several groups established in the aftermath of the Joplin
tornado, including the Jasper County COAD and the
Long-Term Recovery Committee, were reactivated in the
county’s initial COVID-19 response.34 Another local collaboration, One Joplin, included nonprofits and churches in the
counties surrounding Jasper. The members of this coalition
were activated early in the pandemic and communicated
via previously established communication channels. As
the pandemic began, the LPHA in Joplin — along with
hospitals, nursing homes, health centers, and government

agencies in Jasper County and the surrounding
area — engaged in a partnership called the Emergency
Healthcare Coalition, which met regularly to share information and develop contingency plans. Local residents
were also involved in these meetings and provided input
for how to reopen safely.

Limitations of Emergency Preparedness
While the region felt adequately prepared to deal with
tornadoes and floods, pandemic response was a different
matter. Some LPHAs reported years of experience conducting exercises in preparation for health emergencies,
but these drills tended to focus on natural disasters.
According to a public health stakeholder, what they
had “prepared for wasn’t what occurred at all.” Another
leader in public health talked about the challenges of
changing tack from responding to tornadoes — where
“the minute the first stick was picked up the situation
improved”—  to responding to the virus, which required
a starkly different strategy.
Several stakeholders also described a disconnect
between local and state emergency preparedness and
response. LPHAs tapped into local emergency groups,
but limited input from the state precluded a standard
approach across regions. In the public health sector,
multiple stakeholders reported that the state was much
more involved during the H1N1 response in 2009, reliably
communicating and coordinating with the locals. Indeed,
in the post-H1N1 period, a formal regional coordination
system (with staffing) was created, but this effort went by
the wayside as funding for preparedness diminished.35
Had this system been maintained, some stakeholders
felt that regional coordination in response to COVID-19
might have been stronger.

34 Woodin, D. (2020, April 8). Joplin tornado nexus groups reactivate in face of pandemic. The Joplin Globe.
https://www.joplinglobe.com/coronavirus/joplin-tornado-nexus-groups-reactivate-in-face-of-pandemic/article_af8a69fd-c00d5a48-bd50-0d6404f1f7fc.html
35 Levi, J., Vinter, S., Segal, L., St. Laurent, R. Ready or not 2010: Protecting the public from disease, disasters, and bioterrorism.
Trust for America’s Health. (2010). https://www.tfah.org/report-details/ready-or-not-2010/
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B. Community Partnerships Enhanced
the Pandemic Response
So why don’t we go back to one more thing that’s working well?
The relationships and the collaborative effort of the Southwest region
[have] been bar none, by far, the best.
— LOCAL PUBLIC HEALTH STAKEHOLDER

Stakeholders described new and old partnerships in
Southwest Missouri as instrumental in the pandemic
response. These partnerships were structured both within
and across sectors. Collaboration allowed for more-efficient resource identification to meet community needs.
According to stakeholders, the Springfield-Greene area,
in particular, leveraged an array of formally structured
partnerships to address COVID-19. The COVID-19 Task
Force for Homelessness regularly brought Greene County
homeless service providers together regularly to coordinate efforts. Religious leaders in the Springfield-Greene
area came together to organize a faith-based-community
response through the Have Faith Initiative, which served
as a national model for other states.
Tapping partnerships that predated the pandemic
allowed for a more nimble response and, according
to one education stakeholder in the community, “created the ability to network quickly and collaborate
when COVID hit.” Long-standing partnerships such
as the Springfield-based Community Leadership
Forum — made up of leaders from the chamber of
commerce, school districts and higher education, and
other sectors — pivoted to bring in local health care

and public health officials to strengthen their COVID-19
efforts. In a report documenting the Springfield-Greene
pandemic response, the Mayor of Springfield noted
that the region’s cross-sector partnerships were
integral to the successes in the COVID-19 response
and “allowed for connections that would have never
occurred otherwise.”36

Tapping partnerships that predated
the pandemic allowed for a more
nimble response and, according to
one education stakeholder in the
community, “created the ability to
network quickly and collaborate
when COVID hit.”

36 Jackson, A., Scott, A., Knouer, L. First response: Springfield-Greene County confronts COVID-19, March 2020-July 2021. (2021).
https://media.cfozarks.org/covid-report-first-response-web.pdf?mtime=20200924105334
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Community organizations also formed ad hoc or
informal partnerships throughout the pandemic.
These organizations often figured out how they could
meet community needs through word-of-mouth communication rather than formal direction. This was especially
true in the early days of the pandemic because, as one
stakeholder explained, “Initially everybody wanted to
bring everything, so we had truckloads of stuff being
dropped off here. So trying to collaborate with other
agencies to get them that stuff required figuring out
how to distribute it, even taking it to some of our
nearby partners.”
The role of LPHAs in community partnerships varied.
In some counties, LPHA directors engaged in or even
led effective efforts organized by these partnerships.
Southwest LPHAs believed that their established credibility, among other factors, allowed them to step in
as local “connectors” who brought together disparate
groups. While some stakeholders echoed this sentiment, others — particularly those in the health care
sector — noted that LPHAs did not always participate
in partnerships (sometimes due to limited bandwidth

Partnerships between public school
systems and health care warded off
potential staffing shortages whose
effects would have been amplified
throughout the region.
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and resources). This required other stakeholders to take
on leadership roles.
Residents in the focus groups were aware of the players
participating in the pandemic response, particularly in
larger counties. However, many residents perceived
sectors to be working in parallel rather than in collaboration. Some residents said that contradictory protocols
and messages coming from different sectors caused
confusion and seemed to indicate leaders were not
working together. Some felt that the emergence of
organizations outside of public health as strong leaders
in the response suggested the local health departments
were not equipped to handle the pandemic.
Despite resident perceptions, stakeholders said that
community partnerships reduced redundancies and
strengthened response efforts. As one health department
interviewee stated, “The reason we’re partnering [across
sectors] is because we feel like you can be more effective
if you have people within the community engaged in
what you’re working on.” Partnerships between public
school systems and health care warded off potential staffing shortages whose effects would have been amplified
throughout the region. In one instance, a hospital system
teamed up with the education sector to establish a dayschool run by public school volunteer teachers, which
ensured that clinicians would not have to miss work to
care for their kids. Cross-sector partnerships also allowed
practical integration of services and helped LPHAs reach
populations that faced barriers to care. For example, one
health department worked with a housing provider to
operate a mobile vaccine clinic that also provided meals
to those in need. Such collaborations sparked discussions that led officials to reevaluate their strategies for
providing services to vulnerable populations.
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C. LPHA Staffing and Resource Constraints Profoundly
Limited the Effectiveness of the Pandemic Response
We’re going to have to take some hard looks at our workforce
development … [in terms of] training and developing our own internal
staff, so that we can react to situations like a pandemic but also [to]
more day-to-day activities in a more collective fashion.
— LOCAL PUBLIC HEALTH STAKEHOLDER

With the exception of a few LPHAs in more heavily populated areas, most public health agencies in Southwest
Missouri had very few staff going into the pandemic.
Several LPHAs noted they did not have the resources
to employ full-time staff, so certain employees were
routinely contracted out to other counties on different
days of the week — for example, some LPHA directors
also staffed their departments’ WIC programs.

As LPHAs pivoted to respond
to COVID-19, staffing shortages
prompted large internal workforce
shifts, as well as hiring of volunteers
and retired health personnel.

As LPHAs pivoted to respond to COVID-19, staffing
shortages prompted large internal workforce shifts, as
well as hiring of volunteers and retired health personnel.
LPHAs assigned most staff members to pandemic-related
activities at the beginning of the outbreak, and many
reported still devoting the majority of staff to the pandemic in the winter and spring of 2021, as distributing
and administering vaccines became a priority. Some
LPHAs reported being able to hire additional staff with
CARES Act funding, at least temporarily. Several LPHAs
that had staffed up to respond to COVID-19 reported that
the process of hiring new staff was challenging and that
they worried about workforce reductions at subsequent
stages of the pandemic. The pandemic disrupted many
day-to-day public health activities and functions, and
diverted resources. As one example, a local hepatitis A
outbreak was not investigated by the health department.
LPHAs faced huge financial shortfalls if they were one of
the unlucky health departments whose counties declined
to pass along sufficient COVID-19 relief funding when
it became available through the state.37 But even when

37 Kansas City Star. Missouri got millions to fight COVID-19, but 50 health agencies haven’t seen a penny. (2020, August 2).
https://www.kansascity.com/news/coronavirus/article244568372.html
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“I do think a large part is that
our health department here is so
understaffed for something of
this magnitude. So I think they
were constantly trying to pivot
where they could be playing a lot
of catch-up. And so even recently,
now that we’ve shifted towards
the vaccine being their primary
focus … we [are] struggling.”
– Local public health stakeholder

COVID-19 relief funding from CARES Act or other sources
was made available, the administrative requirements
could be onerous, making it difficult for many LPHAs to
take advantage of available funding streams. COVID-19
relief funding in many cases enabled LPHAs to resume
core public health services that had been curtailed or
suspended early in the pandemic. Resuming these services was important to the community, but it was also a
critical component of the LPHA’s financial sustainability.
One LPHA director explained: “We can’t be closed down
because, even though we’re a government entity, we still
rely on funding that we get from our services, insurance
billing, and some other things.”
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Resource and staffing constraints were evident during
LPHAs’ efforts to quickly ramp up testing and rollout vaccination efforts, and were especially apparent during case
surges, when most public health agencies “couldn’t keep
up with the volume” and a lack of personnel prompted
LPHAs to stop tracing close contacts. Focus group residents generally offered praise for LPHAs’ response to
the pandemic, acknowledging that “they’ve done the
best they could do” in the face of overwhelming challenges. Nevertheless, many highlighted challenges in
the provision of pandemic-related services, citing LPHA
staffing and funding constraints: “I do think a large part
is that our health department here is so understaffed
for something of this magnitude. So I think they were
constantly trying to pivot where they could be playing
a lot of catch-up. And so even recently, now that we’ve
shifted towards the vaccine being their primary focus …
we [are] struggling.”
Despite such awareness of LPHAs’ resource challenges,
several residents were frustrated that they could not get
the services they needed in a timely way. Early in the
pandemic, for example, limited laboratory capacity in
the Southwest led to delays in COVID-19 test results
and inefficiencies in contact tracing. Several residents
noted the need for organizations outside of public health
to step in and help facilitate these and other services.
They described instances when LPHAs seemed to rely
heavily on local health facilities, which residents saw as
having better organized testing and vaccination efforts
than their health department.
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D. Poor Coordination Between the State and Local
Levels Exacerbated the Spread of Infection
If you’re talking about international viruses, then it seems silly to say each county should
handle this in their own way. In my mind, the federal government was like, ‘Well, we’re
afraid politically to make a call, so we’re going to pass that to the states.’ In Missouri, the
governor said, ‘I wouldn’t dream of dictating anything to you, because that would be
politically unpopular. So I’m going to ask counties to do it.’  
— LOCAL PUBLIC HEALTH STAKEHOLDER

The state’s “home rule” approach to policy and the
decentralized nature of public health drove a locally
tailored response that attempted to balance safety with
economic interests and personal freedoms. The scope,
scale, and novelty of the pandemic challenged this
approach. Stakeholders and residents repeatedly called
attention to how weak coordination at multiple levels
created a cascade of negative impacts on public safety.
A major challenge stemmed from confusion and disagreement over which entity — the health department,
city, county, or state — had the final authority to implement and enforce pandemic policy.
In some counties, the health department could provide
advice and recommendations to the city council, but
the city council had the legal authority to implement
recommendations and could disregard public health
guidance. Some local elected leaders, for example,
highlighted the importance of personal responsibility
rather than imposing shelter-in-place orders to control
the spread of the virus.38 Recommendations that did
not have the backing of local authorities often went
ignored, and sometimes inflamed community tensions.
When businesses or schools tried to implement their

own mandates, the absence of a local or state mandate,
and the lack of buy-in from law enforcement in some
areas, undermined their ability to enforce them. As one
focus group resident explained, “The corporations are
saying you have to wear a mask and people are going,
‘Yeah, whatever, make me.’”
Stakeholders observed that even community members
who wished to follow guidelines had trouble knowing
which orders were in place in their county or neighboring
areas. Isolation and quarantine orders were generally
issued by LPHAs, but for individuals living in one LPHA’s
jurisdiction and working in another, it was unclear which
orders applied. Crossing the border between Missouri
and Oklahoma, Kansas, or Arkansas further complicated
matters for residents in the Southwest. Additionally, the
professional qualifications and stature of the local public
health boards were not strong in some smaller counties,
further challenging public confidence in the decisions
being made. One stakeholder in the business sector
stated, “There was no decision-making happening at
higher levels, so it forced everyone else to make it up as
you go. Communities like ours are smaller, you’re talking
about farmers and retirees making public health decisions.
They’re just not qualified to make those decisions.”

38 Woodin, D. (2020, April 2). Joplin Mayor: Shelter-in-place order so far not needed. The Joplin Globe. https://www.joplinglobe.
com/coronavirus/joplin-mayor-shelter-in-place-order-so-far-not-needed/article_d4aa7671-4295-5adb-b4f0-5c2fbaa555e9.html
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Residents in the focus groups expressed concern that
patchwork policies confused community members
and undermined public health messaging about the
importance of masks, social distancing, and other CDC
recommendations. For example, focus group residents
from cities with mask mandates, such as Branson and
Springfield, reported that people who wanted to avoid
wearing a mask simply patronized shops and restaurants in
neighboring areas that did not have a mandate. One resident explained that people were “actively seeking places
where they don’t have to [wear a mask] and boycotting
businesses where they do.” Some residents suggested
that the differences in mask ordinances across counties
led to ambiguity that weakened an important frontline
strategy: “It’s absurdly frustrating to see all the mixed messaging ... and, unfortunately, there’s a lot of people going,
‘It doesn’t really matter. Why inconvenience yourself?’”
LPHAs also encountered coordination challenges in
implementing early testing efforts. Requirements for
testing varied from one organization to the next, causing confusion for the public. For example, some LPHAs
and other organizations tested only symptomatic cases.
Furthermore, the cost of testing varied based on where
it was given and was a financial barrier for some individuals. The timeline for results could also be lengthy and
unpredictable, which impeded some residents’ ability
to return to work or school and sometimes served as a
disincentive to get tested, according to residents.
Some stakeholders also felt that using the state highway
patrol map rather than population density or health care
service areas further complicated their response efforts.
This was especially the case with vaccine distribution,
which was perceived by many as resulting in a system
that was “not well-coordinated” and sometimes caused
disproportionate vaccine distribution across and within
regions. Vaccine shipments could also be unpredictable,
with one health department stakeholder stating that
they would learn about a shipment of vaccines only a
day in advance, and had to “mobilize really quickly,”
while continuing to carry out day-to-day functions. State
requirements for vaccine distributors, and the need for
the Pfizer-BioNTech (and eventually Moderna) vaccine
to be stored at cold temperatures, effectively excluded
many LPHAs from the initial vaccine rollout. The questions posed by a public health stakeholder reflected
common sentiment among LPHAs: “Who can store?
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Who’s got storage levels? Who’s got refrigerator space?
Who’s got freezer space? Who’s got all of this?”

Examples of Strong Coordination
Despite the prevailing state of confusion, stakeholders
and residents pointed to some examples where public
health and elected officials did manage to collaborate with one another to develop and implement some
COVID-19 policies, especially in larger counties. These
partnerships saved time, resources, and energy and
helped to navigate major public battles that otherwise
might have sunk mitigation measures during critical
waves of the virus. One city government stakeholder
stated that every decision was made “hand in hand”
with the health department: “You could call them at any
point in time and ask them any question, and they were
prepared to answer those questions.” Another political
leader stated that the city manager, mayor, health department, and city council were “in lockstep” regarding the
passage of a mask mandate. The mayor did not want to
act without full support from public health, even though
he had the authority to enact measures without them.
Many residents in the study noted how important it was
for public health officials to have the endorsement and
public support of local leaders to increase constituents’
confidence in the public health response. These partnerships were seen as critical not only for passing local
ordinances, but also for ensuring better enforcement
of the rules and increasing residents’ trust in LPHAs. As
one resident put it, “I think that communities that had a
good political backing on their public health policies …
probably had more success than counties and cities who
did not have the political support of those individuals.”
Notably, Springfield-Greene was seen as setting an example for more aggressive mitigation measures and guidance.
An LPHA director outside of Greene County stated that
Springfield-Greene “takes a lead role in the region.” A
director of a community organization in a neighboring
county attributed this to strong LPHA leadership, more
resources, and better access to media compared to smaller
counties. While some counties benefited from the example
Greene County set, other areas chose to follow different,
sometimes less-restrictive paths that leaders felt were
more in line with their local conditions.
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E. Weak Data Reporting and Outdated IT Systems
Stymied Timely Decision Making

I don’t think we ever felt like [testing data] was a high predictor
or [useful for] decision-making because we just didn’t know how
it was being administered accurately throughout the region or
state or nation.
— K-12 EDUCATION STAKEHOLDER

Stakeholders noted that outdated IT and the lack of a
standardized approach to tracking cases caused challenges to data collection, analysis, and sharing at both
the local and state level. According to a stakeholder
working for a local government, “There’s always been
a gap between the state’s figures and the local health
department because of how they count.” For nearly five
months, health care providers and LPHAs each relied on
their own separate systems to track cases. When the state
eventually implemented standardized disease tracking
systems like Epitrax, it did so late in the response, forcing
local entities to switch gears midstream. The systems for
tracking cases at the state level were updated several
times throughout the pandemic creating “huge problems”
on the local end and taking precious staff time away
from other pandemic response activities.
Residents in the focus groups who followed the tracking
and reporting of data were often aware of discrepancies between state and local numbers, which eroded
their confidence in public health disease tracking and
monitoring. Several residents said they instead relied on

Matthew Holloway, a Joplin resident, who has tracked the
pandemic statewide with daily Facebook updates since
March 2020.39 Those who followed him on Facebook said
he had more up-to-date numbers than the state. Others
noted that his infographics were engaging and easier
to interpret than some of the public health sites, which
helped them sort through the noise and gain a better
understanding of the virus’s impact in their area.

Outdated IT and the lack of a
standardized approach to tracking
cases caused challenges to data
collection, analysis, and sharing at
both the local and state level.

39 Holloway, M. Missouri COVID-19 update. (2020). https://theholloway.wixsite.com/mholloway-covid19
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Technology both enabled and
hampered access to pandemic
services, including testing
and vaccines.

Some residents said they lacked confidence in LPHAs
who did not update their websites on local COVID-19
conditions. Others faulted their LPHAs for failing to use
texting or other technologies for contact tracing. As one
participant noted, “Our county health department did
not do as well as [other] counties did as far as informing
on different things. They’re not quite as technologically
advanced … So, when we would get updates about
numbers in our counties and stuff like that … it was fairly
slow in coming out.”
Technology both enabled and hampered access to
pandemic services, including testing and vaccines.

24

As stated by one LPHA official, “If I wanted to get
screened for COVID, for example, in the last 12 months,
I would need a solid internet connection. We’re missing
the non-internet-connected or poorly-internet-connected and technology-illiterate communities that I think
are some of the ones that we want to serve the most.”
When vaccines became available and were distributed
to LPHAs and other providers, the systems available at
the local level for making vaccine appointments were
described as “cumbersome and archaic,” and vaccine
distribution data was not easily compared across multiple sectors including health care, public health, state
entities, local pharmacies, and other providers.
Although technology at times burdened the Southwest
pandemic response, it also created some efficiencies.
Some LPHAs saved valuable time by relying on technology to automate components of their disease tracking
and monitoring process. For example, text-notification
systems quickly informed people of their test results;
electronic surveys sped up contact tracing; and websites
were updated with resources like COVID-19 self-reporting tools. As one LPHA remarked, these tools allowed
them to work “smarter rather than harder.”
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F. Disjointed Communications Eroded Public
Confidence and Created Space for Misinformation
to Flourish
It would have been better if health departments and health care
systems could have all sat down at the table early on and said, ‘Let’s
talk about what message we want to send to the community, because
the community is looking to these entities for some sort of guidance.
So let’s do this together. Let’s create a shared message.’  
   — HEALTH CARE STAKEHOLDER

Communication about the pandemic was a critical
responsibility of local public health agencies. Public
health stakeholders said their focus was to make sure
information from state and federal sources reached the
local level in a clear, accessible form.
Despite the successes of some LPHAs early in the
pandemic to control the message and communicate
important guidelines, many stakeholders said that inconsistent and confusing messaging weakened the credibility
of public health. As the pandemic progressed, LPHAs
had to work harder to build and maintain trust and
confidence with both the public and their stakeholder
partners. Inconsistencies in mitigation strategies between
jurisdictions, discrepancies in epidemiological data, and
extensive misinformation spread by social media and
some news outlets proved to be formidable communications challenges.
Like stakeholders, some residents felt that LPHAs faced
communication challenges — often beyond their control
—  that led to confusing messaging. For example, some

said that discrepancies between how the state and
counties reported data undermined the credibility of
public health agencies: “When they talk about the discrepancy in [case] numbers and how information wasn’t
the same, it made it really hard to know who was the
trustworthy source.”
A number of residents also raised concerns about a lack
of information on testing and vaccination sites, and said
that some local health departments could have done a
better job broadcasting this information. Some residents
also said messaging around the safety and efficacy of
the vaccines could have been clearer to help alleviate
concerns related to their emergency authorization status.
Others noted confusion about what to do if they tested
positive for COVID-19. Some reached out to their public
health agencies for guidance on how long to isolate,
when to go back to work, or when to seek out care, and
did not always receive an adequate response to their
questions and concerns. One resident who became sick
with COVID-19 described their experience as follows:
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“It was confusion of where to go, what to do, with whom to
go. And there was disinformation. We did not know what
to do. I think that created … even more terrible panic.”
Notably, smaller LPHAs generally did not have dedicated
communications staff. This left message development
and media outreach to the department director or other
staff, who may have lacked technical capacity in these
areas and had to balance them with other critical duties.

Misinformation Flourished and Further
Eroded Confidence and Trust in LPHAs
Stakeholders pointed to the excess of misinformation
spread on some news outlets and social media sites as
one of the biggest challenges facing LPHAs’ messaging
strategy. These forums constantly undermined public
health messages by calling into question the threat of
the virus and the effectiveness of prevention and mitigation strategies. One stakeholder from a community
organization said large numbers of people in their area
received a “barrage of information telling them this
[the virus] is a hoax.” Other stakeholders expressed
frustration that messages from unvetted internet sources
seemed to resonate more with residents than those from
well-informed experts.
Both stakeholders and residents described how social
media sites stoked division. According to an emergency
management stakeholder, as their organization tried to
encourage people to get vaccinated, they would see
posts on Facebook telling people “don’t get [the vaccine].
They’re tracking us” or “[the vaccine] is not effective.” As
a result, the health department held media conferences
lasting up to three hours, “just trying to dispel some of
those things.” One health care organization stakeholder
explained their efforts to fight misinformation around
vaccine hesitancy: “We try as much as possible to be
a good education resource … for our patients, and try
to help them to get rid of some of the noise and try to
find what’s the reality and what’s vetted information. On
our social media, we try to provide information about
some true sources that you can feel confident in. ‘Here’s
actual validated information about what the vaccine is.’”

In an effort to correct misinformation on certain news
outlets and social media sites, a number of LPHAs saturated their own social media with daily counts, video
messages, and other resources. Health department
leadership stressed the need to “get ahead” of false
information and control the narrative. One local public
health stakeholder said, “I just think we have to be really
cautious and also do a lot better saturation of messaging
in all the different venues ... I don’t think that the state’s
website ... where they talk about the conspiracy theories
is visible enough.”40
Most focus group residents expressed appreciation
for their LPHAs’ communication efforts and said they
looked to public health officials to help cut through the
confusing and sometimes contradictory messages about
the pandemic and public health guidelines. The majority
of focus group participants from the Southwest region
said they trusted their LPHA officials, and one-third
could identify their LPHA director by name. In contrast,
fewer than half said they trusted the state department
of health, and only 2 of the 78 focus group participants
could name the state health director.
The same factors that contributed to misinformation and
diminished public trust also had a profound effect on the
stakeholders we spoke with. Many people in local public
health were physically and emotionally exhausted and
deeply saddened that the pandemic had challenged their
professional and personal relationships in the community.
In some cases, LPHA staff received threats of violence
and were subjected to verbal attacks.

Both stakeholders and residents
described how social media sites
stoked division.

40 Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services. Rumor control. (2020). https://covidvaccine.mo.gov/facts/#rumor-control
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G. Public Health Was Not Sufficiently Responsive
to High Rates of Poverty in the Region
Poverty is a critical issue in Southwest Missouri. While
the average poverty rate in Missouri is 12.9%, nearly
every county in the Southwest (89%) has a poverty rate
that exceeds this.41 People with low or modest incomes
experienced the pandemic differently from more affluent
populations. Service sector workers had no option for
working from home and were thus at greater risk of contracting the virus. For low-income populations living in
rural areas, access to testing, health care, and vaccination
was complicated by long travel times and the absence
of reliable digital connectivity. As the economy suffered
from business shutdowns, residents with lower-paying
jobs were more likely to experience job loss and to
struggle to recover from economic hardships.42 Further,
the pandemic exacerbated already serious inequities
in access to food, housing, and health care. According
to stakeholders, lack of housing, especially as residents
lost their jobs and income, became a major issue. Many
counties in Southwest Missouri provided assistance and
referrals for social services throughout the pandemic,
with informal coordination among the various providers.
For residents who did not qualify for services because
they were immigrants or seasonal workers, community-based organizations and faith-based institutions
played a central role.
Transportation issues were a particularly notable barrier
for individuals with low income. Stakeholders described
the Southwest as “a kind of place where it’s hard to
get around” due to a lack of public transit and the
rural geography, and many cited transportation as a
major equity issue in the region. In some instances, local
transportation companies were able to “provide rides
to the grocery store, to the food pantries, or to a local
health clinic for prescriptions.” But for the most part,

People with low or modest
incomes experienced the
pandemic differently from more
affluent populations.

rural residents and individuals living in poverty faced
significant transit-related barriers. The state’s decision
to prioritize distribution of vaccine doses to hospitals
made access particularly challenging for people without reliable access to transportation. Vaccination thus
disproportionately favored higher-income populations.
As one stakeholder from the health care sector said,
“You were getting this disparity between those who
had access through the hospitals and could get to the
hospitals on such and such day, such and such a time
[and] those who we were serving, which was people
who would never be able to do that.” A local board of
health member reported, “I still think there are people
living in trailers in the woods who can’t get where they
need to go in terms of vaccines.”
Although poverty was widely seen as the most significant
factor contributing to health inequities in the region,
stakeholders said that in many counties, addressing
poverty was not treated as a priority. One stakeholder
working in a social services organization mentioned a
study conducted in the area that showed over a third of
participants felt that people lived in poverty “because they

41 United States Census Bureau. Quick facts. (2020). https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045219
42 Root, B., Simet, L. United States: pandemic impact on people in poverty. (2021, March 2).
https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/03/02/united-states-pandemic-impact-people-poverty#
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“You were getting this disparity
between those who had access
through the hospitals and could
get to the hospitals on such and
such day, such and such a time [and]
those who we were serving, which
was people who would never be
able to do that.”
– Health care stakeholder

made bad choices, and it’s under their control.” The lack
of public support for anti-poverty measures was believed
to have made it difficult to prioritize assistance for people
experiencing poverty during the pandemic in some areas,
with one city government interviewee explaining, “There
are some things that we can do but the issue for us is
going to still be the poverty issue. It is something that is
not talked about as much, and it’s unfortunate because
it is the one thing that’s holding this region back in a
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major way. It’s like it’s holding us hostage.” Stakeholders
serving populations with housing instability expressed
the belief that certain housing policies were not enacted
during the pandemic because of the concern that they
could not be discontinued post-pandemic.
A few residents in the focus groups acknowledged the
increased risk and burden that people with lower incomes
faced during the pandemic. These residents felt similarly
to stakeholders that the issue was marginalized by many
in the community, including those in decision-making
positions. Some discussed a perceived sentiment in the
community that people with lower incomes, “especially
communities in poverty, are over-exaggerating their
health risk, and that everything is just being blown out of
proportion,” making it harder to direct resources to those
communities. Others felt the pandemic response ignored
those vulnerable to the virus due to low socio-economic
status or transience: “I don’t think that our leaders took it
seriously enough, especially in more poverty areas … The
homeless community was kind of shoved back further.
That also happened in poverty neighborhoods because
[officials] didn’t take their health in consideration, and the
schooling in consideration when we did online learning
and stuff. They didn’t help provide ... tutors, nothing. And
so I don’t think that our officials really cared too much
about our smaller communities or our more poverty
areas. Even the homeless included.”
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H. The Pandemic Response Inadequately
Served the Needs of Latino, Black, and
Immigrant Communities
I’m disappointed that our response has not included a response based
on diversity and access. That’s my biggest disappointment.
— LOCAL COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION STAKEHOLDER

Several stakeholders reported that many LPHAs,
educational institutions, health care organizations,
business leaders, policymakers and others did not
adequately engage with people identifying as racial
and ethnic minorities, immigrants, and non-English
speakers. Many individuals identifying as Black and
Latino, in particular, experienced higher rates of infection and deaths in Missouri. Despite being 11% of
Missouri’s population, Black people made up 35%
of COVID-19 cases and 14% of deaths.43, 44 Latino
people are 4% of the population and made up 13%
of COVID-19 cases and 3% of deaths. 45,46 Several
Southwest counties have a significant Hispanic/Latino
presence, as well as immigrants from countries such as
Somalia, Jamaica, and Micronesia (Table C). Even for

those LPHAs that aimed to address the needs of Latino,
Black, and immigrant communities, they could not scale
up staffing or partner with other organizations to provide
services equitably. Often, community and faith-based
organizations were relied on for outreach because they
were viewed as trusted entities.
Focus group residents identifying as Black, Hispanic,
Latino, and/or other racial or ethnic backgrounds keenly
felt the inequities of the pandemic response. Many
residents noted that people who are Black, Hispanic/
Latino, or originally from other countries were more likely
to be essential workers employed in high-risk exposure
occupations and environments like construction, meat
packing factories, and services industries, increasing

43 Kaiser Family Foundation. COVID-19 cases by race/ethnicity. (2021). https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/covid-19-cases-by-race-ethnicity/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D
44 The COVID Tracking Project. Missouri: all race and ethnicity data. (2021). https://covidtracking.com/data/state/missouri/race-ethnicity
45 Kaiser Family Foundation. COVID-19 cases by race/ethnicity. (2021). https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/covid-19-cases-by-race-ethnicity/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D
46 The COVID Tracking Project. Missouri: all race and ethnicity data. (2021). https://covidtracking.com/data/state/missouri/race-ethnicity
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their chances of infection.47, 48, 49 These residents felt that
mitigation strategies in these industries did not always
prioritize the safety of workers over the economics of
staying open. One Hispanic/Latino participant explained,
“Although in some places we can keep distance or cover
our mouths, in other groups it was difficult. And when
most White groups did not wear a mask, then, yes, it
was difficult ... We were at risk.”
Discrimination, misunderstanding, and racism seriously
impacted people’s experiences with the pandemic. One
Hispanic/Latino resident explained, “Many White people
don’t even know us … I don’t think it’s caught people’s
attention because, politically, we don’t have representation,
and the health departments haven’t made a big or major
effort” to reach out to minority groups. Longstanding
distrust of government and medical establishments due
to historic injustices was exacerbated by the pandemic.
This distrust was especially evident with the vaccine, as
one Black resident explained, referring to his wife, who
is White: “I’m not sure if I could walk in that same facility
and get the same thing she got and that’s huge and that’s
where the mistrust comes in.” Focus group residents
identifying as Hispanic Latino also said people in their
community feel fear and distrust of government officials
when they ask for personal information, which impeded
some testing and contact tracing efforts, as well as
registration for the vaccine.
Notably, the first year of the pandemic coincided with
the murder of George Floyd and a wave of Black Lives
Matter protests across the country. The intersection
of these events with the pandemic intensified racial
tensions in many communities in the Southwest. Some
stakeholders stated that, in some places, the attitudes
of the community and of elected officials impeded
anti-racist efforts, both prior to and during the pandemic.
One elected official “got death threats over encouraging
equity, diversity, and inclusion.”

“In much of the Latino
population … the truth is that
many of them do not want to get
vaccinated, for fear of what [the
authorities] are going to ask.”
– Focus group participant

Cultural and Language Barriers Were
Not Adequately Bridged
Throughout the state, the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated linguistic and cultural barriers that hindered
access to health-related needs for people with limited
English proficiency and those with literacy challenges.
In Southwest Missouri, very little information was available in languages other than English. Some health
departments were unable to hire interpreters and
translators, especially for less frequently spoken languages like Arabic and Somali. Even when it came to
Spanish — which is spoken by a significant number of
Hispanic/Latino residents in the region — focus group
residents said they struggled to find Spanish translations of information. One resident described choosing
to personally fill in the gaps: “I had to translate things
to post, to inform people, [because] there was almost
nothing for Hispanic people here.”
Further, public health campaigns did not target nonEnglish-speaking communities with culturally sensitive
messages and often did not disseminate information

47 Hawkins D. Differential occupational risk for COVID‐19 and other infection exposure according to race and ethnicity.
American journal of industrial medicine. 2020;63(9):817-820. doi:10.1002/ajim.23145
48 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Labor force characteristics by race and ethnicity, 2018. (2019).
https://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/race-and-ethnicity/2018/home.htm
49 McNicholas, C., Paydock, M. Who are essential workers? A comprehensive look at their wages, demographics and unionization
rates. (2020, May 19). https://www.epi.org/blog/who-are-essential-workers-a-comprehensive-look-at-their-wages-demographicsand-unionization-rates/
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in forums that these groups frequented. LPHA guidance on isolation/quarantine procedures, for instance,
did not adequately reflect that many immigrant families resided in small dwellings with multi-generational
households where the ability to isolate was limited and
transmission thus was more likely. As one stakeholder
from a community organization said about their LPHA,
“They do a lot of [translations] but you’re talking volume
here. We’re a tiny little county. For them to [engage]
on that level … it’s got to be overwhelming. And so
I’m not faulting them as much as seeing the extraordinary need here.” These linguistic barriers limited the
effectiveness and impact of public health messaging,
doctor-patient communication, and data collection.50
They also delayed implementation of mitigation measures, which led to a higher rate of infection among
people with limited English proficiency.

“If you don’t speak the language,
there’s no contact or someone
the city has here for Hispanics …
When I got vaccinated, it was my
co-worker who told me, ‘There
are going to be vaccines, here’s
where it is,’ and that’s how I was
able to get vaccinated, because
he shared it with me.”
– Focus group participant

50 Ortega P, Martínez G, Diamond L. Language and Health Equity during COVID-19: Lessons and Opportunities. Journal of health
care for the poor and underserved. 2020;31(4):1530-1535. doi:10.1353/hpu.2020.0114
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III. Key Recommendations:
Strengthening the Public
Health Response to COVID-19
and Future Crises in
Southwest Missouri
The infusion of new federal dollars into Missouri has the potential to
bring more money to the state’s public health infrastructure than ever
before. Our hope is that these findings will be leveraged for the purpose
of strengthening the public health system’s ability to continue to respond
to the COVID-19 pandemic and face future crises with greater resources
coordination, equitable strategies, modernized infrastructure, and public
trust. Specific recommendations for advancing this vision are detailed in
our report Missouri’s Public Health Response to COVID-19: Key Findings
and Recommendations for State Action and Investment.51

51 Levi, J., Regenstein, M., Hughes, D., Trott, J., Markus, A., Seyoum, S., Acosta, A.,
Benoit, M., Van Bronkhorst, H., Conway, C. “Missouri’s Public Health Response to
COVID-19: Key Findings and Recommendations for State Action and Investment”.
(September 2021). Health Policy and Management Issue Briefs. Paper 61.
https://hsrc.himmelfarb.gwu.edu/sphhs_policy_briefs/61

TABLE 1. MISSOURI’S PUBLIC HEALTH RESPONSE TO COVID-19: KEY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
STRENGTHENING PUBLIC HEALTH INFRASTRUCTURE IN MISSOURI

Recommendation

The State of Missouri Should:

1

Provide financial support
and technical assistance for
public health accreditation.

Create a special fund to provide technical assistance for LPHAs to assess
readiness for accreditation via the Public Health Accreditation Board, identify
costs to close gaps, and cover fees associated with the accreditation application
process.

2

Prioritize equity.

Expand funding, staff, and other supports to help LPHAs integrate equity
principles into data collection and reporting and community engagement (i.e.,
trust building, links to social services). Increase workforce and funding for the
Office of Minority Health.

3

Build a modernized
surveillance system.

Build a modernized system and provide LPHAs or regional bodies with hardware
and software to manage the system, consistent with federal standards.

4

Create regional
coordinating bodies.

Incentivize and support greater formal sharing of staffing and services
among smaller LPHAs, with a lead public health agency designated to convene
and coordinate, designed to develop and strengthen all foundational public
health capabilities.

5

Bolster the public
health workforce.

Support workforce development through equitable recruiting, hiring, and
promotion practices; new training programs; enhanced salaries for LPHA leaders
with advanced training; and deploy skilled staff within regions.

6

Ensure equitable
public health funding
across the state.

Provide a minimum level of funding for LPHAs, linked to delivery of foundational
public health services and an equity analysis incorporating social vulnerability, and
ensure that public health money flows directly to LPHAs.

7

Clarify LPHA governance
structure and authorities.

Commission legal analysis to create greater consistency in decision making and
oversight across LPHA governance and financing.

8

Harmonize policy
development.

Ensure consistent policies across jurisdictions for public health prevention
and mitigation measures. DHSS should establish and adhere to protocols for
consultation with LPHAs on new policies during emergencies.

SOURCE: Levi, J., Regenstein, M., Hughes, D., Trott, J., Markus, A., Seyoum, S., Acosta, A., Benoit, M., Van Bronkhorst, H.,
Conway, C. “Missouri’s Public Health Response to COVID-19: Key Findings and Recommendations for State Action and
Investment”. (September 2021). Health Policy and Management Issue Briefs. Paper 61. https://hsrc.himmelfarb.gwu.edu/
sphhs_policy_briefs/61
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Appendix A: Methods
and Data Sources
Stakeholder Interviews
This project employed a mixed-methods, qualitative
comparative case study approach to conduct an evaluation of the public health response to COVID-19 in
Missouri. The findings in this report come principally
from interviews with stakeholders: A total of 131 stakeholders from state and local public health departments,
elected and other government officials, health care
organizations, educational institutions, the business
community, faith-based organizations, membership
associations, and a variety of social support services
and other non-profits were interviewed virtually from
October 2020 to May 2021. Thirty of these interviews
were conducted in the Southwest region (Table A).
Interviews were supplemented by media accounts and
other publicly available data sources, as well as focus
groups with 78 residents in Missouri (Table B).
A purposeful sample of stakeholders was recruited in a
mix of counties throughout Southwest Missouri (Table
A) to reflect variation in experiences with public health
practice, local governmental processes and structures,
and potential opportunities for strengthening public
health statewide. Participants were recruited through
snowball sampling, reviews of media reports, and general
research techniques. All interviewees were promised
confidentiality. Interview questions came from guides
developed by GW for this study and customized to the
sector represented by the interviewee. In the vast majority of cases, each interview consisted of one individual
stakeholder and two GW study members. Interviewees
did not receive compensation for their participation

Interviews were audio-recorded with permission and then
transcribed. Alternatively, careful note-taking was used
when interviewees did not consent to audio-recording.
All of the transcripts and notes were coded using the
Dedoose qualitative software platform and following
standard protocols for building a codebook and applying
the codes to transcripts. Each interview transcript was
coded by two or more GW study team members. Coded
interview excerpts were reviewed for common themes,
both within and across geographic regions. Themes were
identified based on a variety of rationales, including the
frequency with which they were mentioned in different
transcripts and regions, the emphasis with which they
were presented, and consensus amongst different GW
study team members.
The selection of regions for in-depth analysis was
informed by the Missouri State Emergency Management
System (SEMA) division of the state into nine distinct
regions (A-I), which are each affiliated with a Highway
Patrol Troop. Highway Region D consists of 18 counties
located in the Southwest corner of Missouri (Figure 2).
These counties include: Barry, Barton, Cedar, Christian,
Dade, Dallas, Greene, Hickory, Jasper, Lawrence, McDonald, Newton, Polk, St. Clair, Stone, Taney, Vernon and
Webster.52 Interviews were conducted with stakeholders
from 6 different sectors in Southwest Missouri’s Highway
Region D (Table A).

52 Missouri Department of Public Safety SEMA. State regional coordinators program.
https://sema.dps.mo.gov/programs/area_coordinator.php
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TABLE A. INTERVIEWS IN SOUTHWEST MISSOURI (OCTOBER 2020 – MAY 2021)
Sector

Who is Included?

Number of Interviews

Business

Chamber of commerce, business councils, economic
groups

2

Community/Faith
Organizations

Non-profits, for-profits, health networks, community
partnerships, social services, churches, faith-based social
service organizations

7

Education

K-12, higher education, and education-focused entities

3

Healthcare

Hospitals and health centers, health care associations,
long-term care facilities, and behavioral health

6

Policy

Government entities (city, county)

5

Public Health

Emergency management, LPHAs, research, and other
public health-focused organizations

7

Total

30

Quotes were selected from transcribed interviews in the
region and were condensed, abbreviated, or minorly
redacted to protect confidentiality and clarify phrases in
the event that the transcription service made errors or if the
interviewees repeated themselves or added filler words
(e.g., “um”) that distracted from their overall statements.

through community-based organizations and leaders,
faith-based institutions, local public health forums, such
as COVID-19-related Facebook groups, health care
organizations, and other community coalitions with
whom the Foundation put us in contact. We recruited
people identifying as racial or ethnic minorities through
multicultural centers and local churches.

Focus Groups with Residents

Our focus group sample comprises self-selected
participants who take the pandemic very seriously. In
line with the convention of purposeful sampling in
qualitative evaluations, this sample provides us with
an intentionally well-informed group of participants,
who have thoughtful and reasoned input on the public
health response in Missouri. While we appreciate that
participation from a more representative population of
residents would have given us perspective on those
with whom the public health response struggled to
engage, we believe our sample provides a more useful
and accurate assessment of how the public health
response unfolded, how it was interpreted by those
who understood its importance, and how the social
and political context in the state impacted it.

We held 12 focus groups with a total of 78 participants,
all of whom resided in the Southwest region. We also
conducted three focus groups with people identifying
as racial or ethnic minorities, including two groups with
Hispanic/Latino individuals (with a total of 16 participants) and one group of Black individuals and their
family members (a total of 12 participants; some family
members identified as White or mixed race). Further, six
residents in the general population focus groups also
identified their race/ethnicity as mixed, Black, Hispanic/
Latino, or American Indian/Alaska Native. We hired
external, race- and language-concordant facilitators
to moderate these groups. We recruited participants
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We collected socio-demographic information from participants using a screening survey disseminated prior to
the focus groups. Participants also provided information
on COVID-19-related questions, including changes in
employment and housing as a result of the pandemic,
whether they worked in an essential job, whether they
had school-age children, whether they had tested positive for COVID-19 and their vaccination status. During
the focus groups, we also collected information from
participants using Google polls. These polls focused on
topics related to the public health response and asked
participants to reflect on specific guidelines, including
those recommended by the CDC, to identify sources of
information they use to get updates on the pandemic,
and to report their level of confidence in local public
health officials.

Over four-fifths (83%) of respondents had completed two
or more years of higher education (college or graduate
school), and most (82%) had a household income of less
than $99,000. Those participating in focus groups had a
variety of employment situations. Most (73%) reported
they worked as paid employees, and a small percentage
(10%) said they were retired. One in nine participants
said they were not working at the time of the focus
group. Many participants lived in rural communities,
with 45% reporting they lived in a non-metro area with a
population of less than 20,000 people. More information
about the Southwest focus group participants can be
found in Table B.

All focus groups were conducted via Zoom and participants were invited to contribute through oral discussion
or written comments using the chat function. Focus
groups were recorded and transcribed for accuracy. Study
members analyzed transcripts and chat records using
NVivo software and examined key themes that emerged
during the discussions. Themes were identified based on
the frequency and intensity with which participants discussed an issue both across and within groups. Poll data
were also analyzed to triangulate themes that emerged in
the groups. Focus group participants received gift cards
to Amazon or local stores in appreciation of their time.

Socio-Demographics of Focus Group
Participants
While the majority of participants in the focus groups
lived in Greene and Taney counties, we also had residents
participate from Polk, Christian, Barry, Stone, Newton,
Lawrence, Dade, Jasper, and McDonald counties. Most
(76%) participants were female and a majority (60%) were
below the age of 50. Most (76%) focus group participants were White, however two Hispanic/Latino focus
groups and one Black focus group were conducted in
the Southwest to address the unique challenges faced by
minority populations in the region. Across both the racial
and ethnic minority and general population groups, 10%
identified as Black and 25% identified as Hispanic/Latino.
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TABLE B. SOUTHWEST FOCUS GROUP PARTICIPANT DEMOGRAPHICS
Number of Respondents

78

Age

Respondents
(% of total)

Language

Respondents
(% of total)

21-29

10 (13%)

Speaking a language other than
English at home, N (%)

19 (24%)

30-39

14 (18%)

40-49

23 (29%)

50-59

13 (17%)

Highest Grade Level/
School

Respondents
(% of total)

60-69

14 (18%)

Some high school, but did not
graduate

2 (3%)

70+

4 (5%)

High school degree or GED

10 (13%)

Some college or 2-year degree

24 (31%)

4-year college graduate

22 (28%)

Graduate school degree

19 (24%)

Other/prefer not to answer

1 (1%)

Income

Respondents
(% of total)

Less than $49,999

37 (47%)

Between $50,000-$99,999

26 (33%)

Between $100,000-$149,000

6 (8%)

Above $150,000

6 (8%)

Other/prefer not to answer

3 (4%)

Gender

Respondents
(% of total)

N (%) female

59 (76%)

Race/Ethnicity

Respondents
(% of total)

White

59 (76%)

Black

8 (10%)

Other

11 (14%)

Identify as Hispanic/Latino

N (%)

Respondents
(% of total)
19 (25%)
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TABLE B. SOUTHWEST FOCUS GROUP PARTICIPANT DEMOGRAPHICS (CONTINUED)
Number of Respondents

78

Employment Status

Respondents
(% of total)

Urban-Rural Makeup

Working (as paid employee)

57 (73%)

City/Metro Area with a Population
of 250,000 or more people

13 (17%)

Self-employed

5 (6%)

Retired

8 (10%)

City/Metro Area with a Population
of 50,000 to 250,000 people

19 (24%)

Not working**

8 (10%)

City/Metro Area with a Population
of 20,000 to 49,000 people

8 (10%)

Non-Metro Area
(population of ≤ 20,000)

35 (45%)

Other/prefer not to answer

3 (4%)

**Category includes those that are unemployed, students, and
those with disabilities which prevent them from working

Respondents
(% of total)

Public Health Infrastructure and Demographics in Southwest Missouri
TABLE C.
PUBLIC HEALTH INFRASTRUCTURE AND DEMOGRAPHICS IN SOUTHWEST MISSOURI

County

Population53

Racial & Ethnic Composition54

Persons
living below LPHA
poverty (%)55 Governance56

Per Capita
Public
Health
Revenue57

Barry
County

34,534

White: 84.5%; Black: 0.7%;
AI or AN: 1.3%; Asian or PI: 2.6%;
Multiracial: 2.0%; Hispanic: 9.9%

18.6%

Board of Trustees

$28.27

Barton
County

11,637

White: 92.4%; Black: 0.6%;
AI or AN: 1.6%; Asian or PI: 0.7%;
Multiracial: 2.7%; Hispanic: 2.9%

15.0%

Board of Trustees

$43.51

Cedar
County

14,188

White: 94.2%; Black: 0.5%;
AI or AN: 1.1%; Asian or PI: 0.6%;
Multiracial: 2.0%; Hispanic: 2.5%

17.9%

County
Commission /
Cedar Co.Hospital

$19.76
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County

Population53

Racial & Ethnic Composition54

Persons
living below LPHA
poverty (%)55 Governance56

Per Capita
Public
Health
Revenue57

Christian
County

88,842

White: 92.9%; Black: 0.9%;
AI or AN: 0.7%; Asian or PI: 0.8%;
Multiracial: 2.0%; Hispanic: 3.1%

10.4%

Board of Trustees

$14.30

Dade
County

7,569

White: 93.2%; Black: 0.5 %;
AI or AN: 1.0%; Asian or PI: 0.7%;
Multiracial: 2.8%; Hispanic: 2.3%

15.9%

Board of Trustees

$68.47

Dallas
County

17,071

White: 94.2%; Black: 0.4%;
AI or AN: 1.0%; Asian or PI: 0.5%;
Multiracial: 1.9%; Hispanic: 2.2%

17.8%

Board of Trustees

$28.44

Greene
County+

298,915

White: 87.0%; Black: 3.5%;
AI or AN: 0.8%; Asian or PI: 2.4%;
Multiracial: 3.0%; Hispanic: 3.9%

14.4%

City Council
& County
Commission

$33.52

Hickory
County

8,279

White: 94.2%; Black: 0.6%;
AI or AN: 1.1%; Asian or PI: 0.4%;
Multiracial: 1.9%; Hispanic: 2.0%

18.2%

Board of Trustees

$59.30

Jasper
County

122,761

White: 83.6%; Black: 2.3%;
AI or AN: 1.9%; Asian or PI: 1.8%;
Multiracial: 3.3%; Hispanic: 8.5%

18.8%

County
Commission

$13.30

Lawrence
County

38,001

White: 88.4%; Black: 0.7%;
AI or AN: 1.2%; Asian or PI: 0.7%;
Multiracial: 2.1%; Hispanic: 7.9%

16.1%

County
Commission

$17.07

McDonald
County

23,303

White: 76.8%; Black: 2.0%;
AI or AN: 3.2%; Asian or PI: 4.4%;
Multiracial: 3.8%; Hispanic: 11.4%

18.5%

County
Commission

$21.33

Newton
County

58,648

White: 85.7%; Black: 1.0%;
AI or AN: 2.6%; Asian or PI: 2.6%;
Multiracial: 3.3%; Hispanic: 5.6%

13.2%

Board of Trustees

$19.73

Polk
County*

31,519

White: 93.4%; Black: 1.0%;
AI or AN: 0.8%; Asian or PI: 0.9%;
Multiracial: 1.8%; Hispanic: 2.5%

19.6%

Board of Trustees

$40.45
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County

Population53

Racial & Ethnic Composition54

Persons
living below LPHA
poverty (%)55 Governance56

Per Capita
Public
Health
Revenue57

St. Clair
County

9,284

White: 94.4%; Black: 0.7%;
AI or AN: 0.9%; Asian or PI: 0.4%;
Multiracial: 1.7%; Hispanic: 2.3%

19.3%

Board of Trustees

$47.68

Stone
County

31,076

White: 94.6%; Black: 0.4%;
AI or AN: 0.9%; Asian or PI: 0.6%;
Multiracial: 1.6%; Hispanic: 2.4%

15.4%

Board of Trustees

$32.99

Taney
County*+

56,066

White: 88.2%; Black: 1.8%;
AI or AN: 1.1%; Asian or PI: 1.3%;
Multiracial: 2.3%; Hispanic: 6.2%

12.6%

Board of Trustees

$55.08

Vernon
County

19,707

White: 93.6%; Black: 1.0%;
AI or AN: 0.8%; Asian or PI: 0.8%;
Multiracial: 1.9%; Hispanic: 2.3%

17.1%

Board of Trustees

$32.19

Webster
County

39,085

White: 94.0%; Black: 1.2%;
AI or AN: 0.8%; Asian or PI: 0.4%;
Multiracial: 1.9%; Hispanic: 2.2%

16.2%

Board of Trustees

$27.13

* MICH Accreditation58, + PHAB Accreditation59

53 54 55 56 57 5859

53 United States Census Bureau. Quick facts. (2020). https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045219
54 United States Census Bureau. Quick facts. (2020). https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045219
55 United States Census Bureau. Quick facts. (2020). https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045219
56 Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services. Public Health Works. (March 2019).
https://health.mo.gov/living/lpha/phworks/publichealthworks.pdf
57 Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services. Revenue Sources for Local Public Health Agencies. (2018).
https://health.mo.gov/living/lpha/review18/Table_Contents.php
58 Missouri Institute for Community Health. Accredited Agencies in Missouri. https://michweb.org/accredited-agencies-in-missouri/
59 Public Health Accreditation Board. Complete List of Nationally Accredited Health Departments, Missouri. (2021, August 24).
https://phaboard.org/who-is-accredited/
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